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In the C  IPS 
The global market for dollars has created the 
need for an efficient mechanism to transfer 
dollar funds among banks throughout the 
world. The banking system now transfers 
about $ '130 billion every ciay, with New York 
City banks handling nearly 90 percent of all 
such transactions. These interbank payments 
employ a little-known electronicfunds-
transfer (EFT) system called CHIPS: the Clear-
ing House Interbank Payments System. The 
history and operation of CHIPS illustrate the 
prospects and challenges that lie ahead for 
financial institutions and their regulators as 
EFT systems evolve further. 
Clearing house functions 
The evolution of funds-transfer mechanisms 
like CHIPS can be traced to the changing 
nature and volume of  payments activity. Sim-
ple transactions -such as the transfer of 
funds between two local parties who use the 
same bank-do not require elaborate mech-
anisms for effecting payment. Party A simply 
writes a check on its account at the bank, and 
when party B presents the check for payment 
at the same bank, the account of A is debited 
and the account of B is credited. 
If the parties have different banks, however, 
the transaction involves an interbank ex-
change of funds. This requires communica-
tion between the parties' banks to provide the 
accounting information needed to record the 
transaction (part of the process called "clear-
ing") and to provide some means of  finJlizing 
(or "settling") the obligations of one bank to 
the other. As an economy grows and the 
number of banks increases, this type of trans-
action increases in frequency. 
In the early days of banking, clearing and 
settling involved direct exchanges of objects 
between banks. Messengers carried checks 
back and forth between individual banks, 
and those banks settled the obi igations 
created by such drafts by the physical move-
ment of gold or bank-note assets. As the 
number of banks grew, the amount of inter-
bank communication rose sharply, and 
"clearing houses" came into heing to 
simplify the process. By rroviding all hanks 
with central meeting places, clearing houses 
streJmlined the check clearing and settle-
ment processes considerably. 
As the volume of transactions grew further, 
the clearing-house functions of check clear-
ing and settlement frequently became lagged 
processes: banks would post each day's trans-
actions to their own books at an agreed-upon 
time, but would delay settlement by a day 
because of  the difficu Ity of immediately satis-
fying the net settlement obligations to all 
other banks. (Unti I each transaction is settled, 
the proceeds cannot be used in any domestic 
transactions outside the clearing house, 
although they can be used internally.) More-
over, over time, the settlement of  transactions 
through the exchange of  gold and bank notes 
gave way to the exchange of other forms of 
"good funds," mainly Federal Reserve and-
correspondent balances. 
Evolution of CHIPS 
CHIPS is owned and operated by one such 
clearing house-the New York Clearing 
House Association (NYCHA). NYCHA has 
been in existence since 1853 to service inter-
bank transactions for New York banks. As a 
focal point for many domestic and interna-
tional transactions, the New York banks have 
always generated a substantial volume of 
interbank transactions. Prior to 1971, the 
clearing house handled these transactions in 
the traditional manner-exchanging paper 
checks at the clearing house and effecting 
settlement the next day by a transfer of 
reserve balances. 
But in view of New York's prominence as an 
international-banking center, and in view of 
the growing activity in Eurodollarand foreign-
exchange markets in the late sixties, the New 
York banks eventually found themselves with an expanded volume of international dollar 
transfers. The old paper process of clearing 
and settling dollar payments presented an 
increasing number of problems. First, the old 
system created severe "back room" prob-
lems for banks, because of the sheer volume 
of paper that had to be handled to initiate a 
transfer of funds for their customers. Payment 
instructions had to be typed, official checks 
had to be written, and messengers had to be 
dispatched to the clearing house. The process 
was cumbersome and costly. 
Second, the manual payments system appar-
ently created problems of risk management. 
For example, a customer often asks a bank to 
initiate a payment on his behalf before the 
customer has "covered" the transfer with 
good funds in his account. As long as cover is 
received before the check is dispatched to the 
clearing house, the bank's exposure is mini-
mized; however, the bank may decide to take 
the risk that the cover will be received by the 
settlement time (the next day), which means 
initiating the transfer without cover and carry-
ing the customer overnight. Permitting an 
overn ight overd raft of  a customer's accou  nt is 
a potentially important credit decision which 
becomes difficult to make amid the paper-
work and time pressures involved in manual 
clearing-house procedures. 
In response to these problems, NYCHA 
initiated CHIPS in 1971, utilizing a small 
computer and 42 terminals located in the 
clearing-house banks. Through a system of 
account-identification numbers, CHIPS per-
mitted complete payment instructions to be 
exchanged electronically between the two 
banks involved in any transfer, and in the 
process eliminated the former paper media. 
The system grew rapidly, especially after 
1974, when CHIPS installed more computer 
capacity and extended associate member-
ship to the agencies and branches of foreign 
banks and New York Edge Act corporations. 
Today CHIPS has over 90 members, and has 
experienced peak volumes of nearly $200 
billion, compared to about $4 billion daily in 
its first year of operation. 
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Operation of CH I  PS 
Modern technology has made possible the 
rapid growth of CHIPS' payments activity. 
The CHIPS computer operates on a "store 
and release" basis. A bank making a payment 
on behalf of one of its customers simply 
provides the CHIPS computer with payment 
instructions, including assigned account-
identification numbers. The computer stores 
this information until an authorized person at 
the bank approves the release of the message 
to the receiving bank. This relieves the 
account officer of some of  the decision-
making pressures involved in payment 
authorizations  for transactions that have not 
yet been covered. 
The CHIPS computer also performs the basic 
accounting functions required for clearing 
and settlement. At the end of  each day, CH  I  PS 
nets out the debits and credits to members' 
accounts that occurred during the day, and 
composes the settlement obligations for each 
bank. Actual settlement occurs the next day 
at 10:00 a.m. If the bank is an associate 
member of  CHIPS, it typically settles through 
a correspondent account-at one of 14 
"settling" member banks which acts as its 
sponsor. (These 14 banks are the 12 large 
members of NYCHA plus two Edge corpora-
tions of non-New York banks.) The "settling" 
members exchange reserve balances at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of  New York to achieve 
settlement. (Recent rule changes open the 
door for all CHIPS members to settle directly 
at the Fed if they have an account there.) 
Payments systems and risk 
Credit risk arises in all payments mechanisms 
because banks often implicitly extend credit 
in order to facilitate transactions for their 
customers. In the context of  CHIPS, for 
example, a bank may initiate a payment on 
behalf of a customer anticipating receipt of 
"cover" (from the customer) by the settle-
ment hour. If the bank fails to receive the 
cover, however; it must incur the expense of 
disentangling itself from the transaction. The 
failure to receive cover may occur for a 
number of reasons, including the financial collapse of a customer or a bank in the trans-
actions link. A serious problem of this sort 
arose in 1974, with the sudden demise of the 
Herstatt Bank of Germany. 
This type of risk is not peculiar to CHIPS. 
However, other potential problems may 
occur under CHIPS settlement procedures. 
That process, for example, involves a 
/Jnetting" of the settlement obligations of a 
CHIPS participant within its account at a set-
tlement bank. Despite obvious accounting 
advantages, this procedure makes the settle-
ment accounts of  the various participants 
highly interdependent. If one participant is 
unable to obtain funds for settlement by the 
settlement hou r, th is can affect the net obi  iga-
tions of many other participants and cause a 
chain of settlement problems, with the set-
tling members probably bearing the ultimate 
credit risk. CHIPS employs a number of pro-
ceduresJo control such problems, including 
a set of  rules for /Junwinding" transactions if  a 
participant is unable to obtain funds for settle-
ment, but potential difficulty may remain. 
The convention of next-day settlement may 
also contribute to credit risk within the 
system. Most other domestic and European 
payments systems use a same-day settlement 
convention: transfers are made in immedi-
ately available /Jgood funds." Thus the risk 
associated with uncovered transfers does not 
extend overnight. It is debatable, however, 
that the resultant reduction in settlement lag 
wou  Id reduce overall risk. But clearly, 
moving to same-day settlement imposes 
additional operating costs on participants 
because banks have less time to make adjust-
ments to errors in their CHIPS transactions 
and their settlement positions. NYCHA is cur-
rently studyi ng these and other factors 
involved in a conversion of CHIPS to same-
day settlement. 
Other EfT issues 
NYCHA's experience with CH  I  PS serves to 
illustrate otherfactors that arise in EFT 
operation. One such consideration is the 
competitiveness (or lack of competitiveness) 
3 
of the payments marketplace. Because EFT 
systems generally cI isplay considerable 
economies to scale, single suppliers can often 
serve entire markets economically. (CHIPS, 
for example, handles virtually all of the New 
York banks' interbank transfers of dollars.) 
Banking institutions-and their regulators-
are concerned that such technological imper-
atives may lead to anti competitive behavior 
on the part of providers of EFT services. 
Another consideration involves the risks to 
the "safety' of the banking system posed by 
the existence of private settlement mech-
anisms. Under CHIPS, for example, NYCHA 
members perform settlement services for 
smaller CHIPS participants through debiting 
and crediting of correspondent balances, 
rather than through transactions with Federal 
Reserve banks. 
This is an attractive feature for those users 
who do not have Federal Reserve bank 
accounts. In addition, this feature reduces the 
amount of Federal Reserve processing 
required. Some observers of the EFT industry 
fear, however, that such private settlement 
devices make the health of the payments 
mechanism overly dependent upon the 
health of  the settling institutions. 
Despite these challenges, CHIPS illustrates 
EFT's great potential for improving the effi-
ciency of  financial markets, by expanding the 
range of services available to financial insti-
tutions, their customers, and the general 
public. As a result, CHIPS-like systems are 
likely to evolve to perform payments func-
tions in other markets. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELftH fEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banles 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments*  . 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves ( +  )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves ( +  )/Net horrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent' 
11,483  +  9.1 
12,860  +  12.5 
2,510  +  8.1 
8,979  +  24.2 
2,353  +  10.8 
522  31.4 
1,463  - 18.7 
86  +  0.6 
2,105  +  5.2 
129  +  0.4 
3,640  12.3 
14,892  +  29.8 
15,201  +  37.3 
6,212  +  36.2 
Comparahle 
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